# MProbe: Make the code probing meaningless

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### How does code probing works?

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Vector 1: arbitrary read.
 Variants of heart bleed

JIT-ROP

- Vector 2: arbitrary jump.
   BROP—Blind ROP
- Vector 3: Side-channel Probing.

Analyze the TLB hit and miss.

Vector 4: Data leakage.

DOP—read the PLT and GOT where store the code addresses





## How does MProbe defend against code probing?

The main idea of MProbe is to make the probed code lose its execution permission in the original address space.



Figure 1: The overall architecture of MProbe

#### probe-wall

- Detect the probing activities.
- permission manager
  - Disable the execution permission of the probed code.
  - Migrate the probed code to a random address space
  - security engine
    - Judge the legitimacy of the control flow
- CF transfer
  - Redirect the control flow to the random space



- 1. perceive the code probing activities
- 2. prevent the probed code snippets from being used as gadgets
- ensure the probed code to be called legally

#### • Perceive the probing attacks

The buddy system is modified to create a memory pool, which is the source of code page allocation. Pages in this pool are pre-set as unreadable. **Perceive Vector 1**.



Figure 2. The overall design of user code memory allocation

- Perceive the probing attacks
- Perceive Vector 2 (arbitrary jump)
  - 1. Capture SIGSEGV and SIGILL

2. Record the code triggers SIGSEGV and SIGILL

3. Identify the restated process.

• Perceive Vector 3 (side-channel probing)

1. Map the space at V+n\*xGB (n<8, x=1 or 512)

2. Set the page tables of the space to be unreadable

- Perceive the probing attacks
- Perceive Vector 4 (data leakage)
  - 1. Set GOT to be unwritable
  - 2. Store the library function address in a non-readable code snippet
  - 3. Fill the code snippet's starting into GOT



Figure 3. Hide the function address in GOT

- Prevent the probed code is used as a gadget
- Vector 1 (arbitrary read)
- 1. When the Vector 1 is perceived, MProbe directly prevent the current code reading.
- Vector 4 (side-channel probing)
- 1. When the Vector 2 is perceived, MProbe directly prevent the current memory access.

Prevent the probed code is used as a gadget



Figure 4. Migrate a code block to a random space

For the Vector 2 or Vector 3, the probed code block containing an ICT instruction will be migrated to a new random space

Prevent the probed code is used as a gadget

#### • Security strategies:

- 1. In the same mapped space, *jmp* \* jumps to the inside of the current function; *call* \* can only jump to the head of other functions.
- 2. If without going through PLT, *call* and *jmp* cannot transfer the control flow to a library from application code, nor can transfer it to any other libraries from the current library.
- 3. The jump targets of ICT instructions must conform to the code alignment forms in the ELF file.
- 4. The return address of the instruction ret cannot be changed before ret is executed.

#### • Transfer the legal control flow.



Figure 5. Transfer the legal control flow

- 1. Rewrite the probed code block
- 2. The control flow transferred to the rewritten code in the real code space triggers a system trap
- 3. Check its legitimacy



- Security
- Arbitrary read:
- 1. The modified HeartBleed can be detected due to the captured SIGSEGV.
- 2. The code reading of *memcpy(bp,pl,payload)* in openssl can be detected due to the unreadable code segment.
  - Arbitrary jump:
  - 1. Blind ROP can be detected due to the captured SIGSEGV or SIGILL.

- Security
- side-channel probing:
- 1. The attacker cannot obtain the 30th~32nd bits and 39th~41st bits of the virtual address.
- 2. The typical side-channel attacks such as flush+reload, EVICT+TIME and PRIME+PROBE can also be detected and blocked by MProbe whenever they read the code.
  - GOT leakage:
  - 1. What the attackers obtain are not the real addresses of library functions.

#### Security

Control flow detection

binary code	size	total gadgets	gadget chains	defense
libcodeblocks.so	4267	535758	70	$\checkmark$
libcapstone.so	869	109538	3	V
libfam.so	15	1969	1	V
libnetpbm.so.10	60	7704	1	V
libwxsmithlib.so	1719	187992	48	V
400.perlbench	877	100750	5	V
401.bzip2	45	3942	1	V
403.gcc	2285	254156	29	V
429.mcf	8	1079	1	V
471.omnetpp	401	56954	2	V

- performance
- SpecCPU 2006



Figure 6. SpecCPU2006 test results.

- performance
- Lmbench



Figure 7. Lmbench test results.

- performance
- Probing test



Figure 8. MProbe's impact on the process after a probing attack.



### Conclusion

#### Conclusion

- (1) Propose a probing perception mechanism.
- (2) Propose a protection mechanism to prevent the probed code from being used as gadgets.
- (3) Implement the MProbe prototype in Linux.

### THANKS