FAuST: Striking a Bargain between Forensic Auditing's Security and Throughput

Muhammad Adil Inam, Akul Goyal, **Jason Liu**, Jaron Mink, Noor Michael, Sneha Gaur, Adam Bates, Wajih Ul Hassan

> Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC) 2022 December 9, 2022



• High-profile APT attacks last for years [1]

[1] <u>https://orangematter.solarwinds.com/2021/01/11/new-findings-from-our-investigation-of-sunburst/</u> [2] <u>https://www.logsign.com/blog/how-long-should-security-logs-be-kept/</u>

[3] https://www.auditboard.com/blog/security-log-retention-best-practices/



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September 2019 Earliest code evidence of attack

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December 2020 SolarWinds attack detected

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- Most organizations store logs for a few months [2,3]

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
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- Most organizations store logs for a few months [2,3]
- Each machine can generate 400-1200 GB per year [4,5]
- Log analysis often costs at least \$1500 per GB [6] \bullet

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
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
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Keeping only Important Logs

- Data compression only gets so far [1]
 - Investigation tools need to be able to search for key events
- Researchers instead leverage data provenance to reduce logs



[1] https://www.elastic.co/blog/filebeat-modiles-access-logs-and-elasticsearch-storage-requirements





Provenance graphs allow us to reason about causality relationships

Audit Log












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Audit Log

t1, open, firefox, /tmp/foo








Provenance graphs allow us to reason about causality relationships

Audit Log

t1, open, firefox, /tmp/foo t2, write, firefox, /tmp/foo








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Audit Log

- t1, open, firefox, /tmp/foo
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- t3, clone, firefox, bash








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- t1, open, firefox, /tmp/foo
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- t4, read, firefox, /tmp/foo








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- t1, open, firefox, /tmp/foo
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- t5, socket, bash, X.X.X.X










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




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




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


- LogGC: remove temporary file I/O that cannot affect other parts of the graph [1]
 - Claimed ~93-97% reduction
- CPR: remove parallel edges that do not add any new causal information
 [2]
 - Claimed ~56% reduction, and that it can be combined with LogGC

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





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





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





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• To what degree are different techniques actually orthogonal?

LogGC CPR


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 - Is ~95% reduction for LogGC and ~56% for CPR a fair comparison?



Comparing Reduction Techniques



• To what degree are different techniques actually orthogonal?




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Comparing Reduction Techniques





FAUST: Transparent & Modular Reduction

• Implement reduction techniques in an extensible modular framework

Combine multiple reduction
 techniques simultaneously

• Evaluate and compare reduction performance and throughput for any combination




Streaming Audit Logs



FAUST

Downstream Tools Streaming Audit Logs






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





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






































- Local techniques: analyze subgraphs in response to certain events
- Global techniques: analyze entire graph in offline setting








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






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LogGC Kyu Hyung Lee et al. CCS '13

CPR and PCAR Zhang Xu et al. CCS '16

Batch

NodeMerge Yutao Tang et al. CCS '18


F- and S-DPR

Md Nahid Hossain et al. USENIX Security '18

Winnower Wajih UI Hassan et al. **NDSS** '18

LogApprox Noor Michael et al. ACSAC '20

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


Reduction Filters: CPR

t1, clone, ... t2, read, ... • • • t4, read, ... t5, read, ... • • • t11, read, ... t12, clone, ... t13, read, ... t14, clone, ... t15, send, ... • • • t21, recv, ... t22, connect, ... t23, clone, ... t24, send, ... • • • t30, recv, ... t31, write, ... t32, exec, ... t33, connect, ...

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CPR



Zhang Xu et al., CCS '16






Reduction Filters: CPR

t1, clone, ... t2, read, ... * ... * t4, read, ... t5, read, ... * ... * t11, read, ... t12, clone, ... t13, read, ... t14, clone, ... t15, send, ... * ... * t21, recv, ... t22, connect, ... t23, clone, ... t24, send, ... • • • t30, recv, ... t31, write, ... t32, exec, ... t33, connect, ...

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




CPR NodeMerge

t1, clone, ... t2, read, ... * ... * t4, read, ... t5, read, ... * ... * t11, read, ... t12, clone, ... t13, read, ... t14, clone, ... t15, send, ... * ... * t21, recv, ... t22, connect, ... t23, clone, ... t24, send, ... • • • t30, recv, ... t31, write, ... t32, exec, ... t33, connect, ...

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Reduction Filters: NodeMerge

Yutao Tang et al., CCS '18










CPR NodeMerge

t1, clone, ... t2, read, ... * ... * t4, read, ... t5, read, ... * * * ... ** t11, read, ... t12, clone, ... t13, read, ... t14, clone, ... t15, send, ... * ... * t21, recv, ... t22, connect, ... t23, clone, ... t24, send, ... • • • t30, recv, ... t31, write, ... t32, exec, ... t33, connect, ...

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Reduction Filters: NodeMerge

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


Reduction Filters: S-DPR

CPR NodeMerge S-DPR

	t1, (clone,	•	•	•			
	t2, 1	read, .	•	•				
*	• • •							
*	t4, 1	read, .	•	•				
*	t5, 1	read, .	•	•				
* *	• • •							
* *	t11,	read,	•	•	•			
	t12,	clone,		•	•	•		
	t13,	read,	•	•	•			
	t14,	clone,		•	•	•		
	t15,	send,	•	•	•			
*	• • •							
*	t21,	recv,	•	•	•			
	t22,	connec	t	,		•	•	•
	t23,	clone,		•	•	•		
	t24,	send,	•	•	•			
	• • •							
	t30,	recv,	•	•	•			
	t31,	write,		•	•	•		
	t32,	exec,	•	•	•			
	t33,	connec	:t	,		•	•	•

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Md Nahid Hossain et al., USENIX Security '18






Reduction Filters: S-DPR

CPR NodeMerge S-DPR

t1, clone, ... t2, read, ... * * ... * * t4, read, ... t5, read, ... * * * ... * * * t11, read, ... t12, clone, ... t13, read, ... t14, clone, ... t15, send, ... * ... * * t21, recv, ... t22, connect, ... t23, clone, ... t24, send, ... * * • • • t30, recv, ... * t31, write, ... t32, exec, ... t33, connect, ...

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


Final Reduction

CPR NodeMerge S-DPR

t1, clone, ... t2, read, ... * * ... * * t4, read, ... t5, read, ... * * * * ... *** * *** t11, read, ... t12, clone, ... t13, read, ... t14, clone, ... t15, send, ... * * ... * t21, recv, ... * t22, connect, ... t23, clone, ... t24, send, ... * * • • • t30, recv, ... * t31, write, ... t32, exec, ... t33, connect, ...


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




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








Reduction (%)






• Diminishing returns for increasing number of filters

 2-3 filters is generally a decent tradeoff of reduction to performance











 Diminishing returns for increasing number of filters


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Reduction (%)





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
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
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Reduction (%)





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
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Performance Evaluation






Reduction performance largely levels off by 100k logs per batch

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Performance Evaluation



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Local filters have much higher throughput than batch filters





Conclusion

- FAuST: easily implement and evaluate log reduction techniques
- Available open-source at <u>https://bitbucket.org/sts-lab/faust</u>
 - Transparent log reduction tool for any log analysis project or workflow
 - Easy baseline comparison with 8 existing techniques for new reductions
 - We use FAuST to enable our SoK on log reduction techniques [1]

Muhammad Adil Inam <<u>mainam2@illinois.edu</u>> Jason Liu <jdliu2@illinois.edu>

[1] Muhammad Adil Inam et al., IEEE SP'23





