

Dissecting ARID

Implementing and Evaluating Security Solutions on Open-Source Drones

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Learning from Authoritative Security Experiment Results (LASER) 2021 | ACSAC 2021

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Agenda




Motivations

Security and Privacy Issues of UAVs



ARID Phases

Remote Identification *aka* RemoteID vs ARID



Implementation Details

What we did in terms of programming




Performance Assessment

ARID and its performance assessment




Conclusion and Future Work

What we offered and what are the future ARID extensions



ARID

Motivations



Worldwide Drone Incidents

- Police and air traffic control intervene after drone spotted at Newcastle – Stadiums - Newcastle, United Kingdom - October 8, 2021
- Criminals Use Drones to Drop 5 Liters of Flammable Liquid - Law Enforcement/First Responders - October 1, 2021
- Drone crashes into Leaning Tower of Pisa - Private/Non-Corporate - Pisa, Italy - September 28, 2021
- Drone spies on private home - Private/Non-Corporate - Albringhausen, Germany - July 11, 2021 ...

SOURCE: [HTTPS://WWW.DEDRONE.COM/](https://www.dedrone.com/)



FAA Remote IDentification Rule

- Enhance accountability of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles(UAVs) operations
- It forces all UAVs operators to broadcast messages reporting their identity, location (GPS position), and information about ground station
- *RemoteID* does not specify how to generate such identifiers, nor provide guidelines to operators for their design
- Effective on the 21st of April 2021, and UAV operators need to comply with this rule from September 2022



**Federal Aviation
Administration**
REMOTE ID RULE

UAV must periodically broadcast messages containing at least the following information

Unique ID	Drone Latitude, Longitude, Altitude, Speed	GCS Latitude, Longitude, Altitude	Timestamp	Emergency Status
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Motivations



News Products Industries Enthusiasts Regulations


When Will Remote ID Go Into Effect? FAA Announces Date

Posted By: Miriam McNabb on: March 13, 2021



TRENDING // THE FIRST 100 DAYS // THE HACK // 5G // SPONSORED: APPLIED INTELLIGENCE // SPONSORED: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE // SPONSORED: IT MODERN

FAA Delays Drone Remote ID Tracking, 'Operations Over People' Rules



BIZAV AIR TRANSPORT DEFENSE EVENTS SUBS

NBAA: Remote ID Drone Rule Raises Privacy Concerns


by Kerry Lynch - January 22, 2021, 10:19 AM

Privacy nightmare? FAA's drone tracking rules have big consequences

New rules require broadcast of information that could compromise delivery customers' privacy.

By Greg Nichols for Robotics | January 4, 2021 | Topic: Robotics

Cybersecurity Alert: FAA Releases New Rules Concerning Drone Use




1) Registration Phase

2) On-Line Phase

3) Reporting Phase

ARID - PHASES




ARID: Anonymous Remote IDentification

1 Registration Phase



Register an UAV with the Authority, in a way to enable unique identification and receives the cryptography materials necessary to run ARID.

2 Online Phase



UAV generates and emits RemoteID-compliant messages, enabling operators to identify their locations, while still preserving UAV anonymity.

3 Reporting Phase




Triggered by a Critical Infrastructure (CI) operator, when it detects an invasion of the protected area by an UAV, CI reports the attack to the Auth.




Why we implemented ARID

ARID is implemented because:


- To evidence the compliance with the flying constrained devices (UAVs as the new “Flying IoT”)
- To evaluate the Performance on limited battery lifetime devices with a minimum impact!
- Of releasing open-source code to enhancing the impact of ARID, demonstrating its deployability to improving the quality of the provided security services in real-world UAV systems
- To demonstrate and evaluate that it is possible develop and integrate a real (security & privacy) solution even on commercial UAVs






ARID AT WORK!


Implementation Details




Registration Phase



Online Phase



Reporting Phase



Drone Features – 3DR Solo Drone

- CPU i.MX6 Solo - 1.00GHz ARM Cortex A9
- 7,948.00 MB ROM, 512MB RAM
- Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module
- WiFi Module supports IEEE 802.11b
- 3DR Poky OS 1.5.1 – Linux based OS



HW/SW Requirements



Laptop

A laptop equipped with a GNU/Linux distro




Drone

It can execute ELF 32-bit LSB (i.e. OS Linux)
It supports MAVLink 1.0/2.0
Ardupilot/PX4 flight controller




NIC in Monitor Mode (optional)

ALFA Card AWUS036NH/AWUS036ACH




Software Defined Radio (optional)

- HackRF One
- gps-sdr sim (to generate GPS baseband signal data strams for indoor tests)



GNU Arm Embedded Toolchain

```
sudo apt-get install gcc-arm-linux-gnueabihf  
g++-arm-linux-gnueabihf
```




Sniffing Tool(s)

```
sudo apt-get install -y tcpdump wireshark
```



OpenSSL Library 1.0, MAVLink 1.0


Compile OpenSSL 1.0 (libssl.so.1.0.0) for ARM and install the library on the UAV. **Compile it on your PC and install it manually via SSH.**



GCC, G++ cross compilers

```
- sudo apt-get install libc6-armel-cross libc6-  
dev-armel-cross binutils-arm-linux-gnueabi  
libncurses5-dev build-essential bison flex  
libssl-dev bc
```

Cryptography Details




Hashing Function

SHA-256




Signature Algorithm

Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
(ECDSA)




Elliptic Curve Cryptography

secp160r1, secp192k1, secp224k1, secp256k1



Asymmetric Enc/Dec Algorithm

El-Gamal



Symmetric Enc/Dec Algorithm

AES-128



PseudoRandom Number Generator

Read 2048 bits from /dev/urandom
`RAND_load_file("/dev/urandom", 256)`



Implementation Details





Table 1: MAVLink Frame and ARID Payload Notation.

Acronym	Content/Size	Description
SOF	0xFE	MAVLink 1.0. Start of Frame
LEN	0x00-0xFF	Payload Length.
SEQ	0x00-0xFF	Sequence number. The value 0x00 represents the first message.
SID	0x01-0xFF	System Identification number of the UAV.
CID	0x00-0xFF	System Identification number of the component that is transmitting the message.
MID	0x00-0xFF	Message Type Identification number. Set to 0XDE for ARID.
Payload	0-255 B	ARID message.
CRC	2 B	Checksum for integrity check.
ARID Payload		
RES	3 B	Reserved Bytes (e.g. Network, System and Component ID).
PID	67-91 B	UAV Pseudonym $c_{n,t}$ (size based on selected curve).
EKEY	42-66 B	Encrypted one-time key $\rho_{n,t}$ (size based on selected curve).
$U_{LAT}, U_{LON}, U_{ALT}$	12 B	UAV Latitude, Longitude, and Altitude (4 bytes each).
U_{VX}, U_{VY}, U_{VZ}	6 B	UAV Speed x, y and z axis (2 bytes each).
$C_{LAT}, C_{LON}, C_{ALT}$	12 B	Latitude, Longitude, and Altitude of the Ground Station (4 bytes each).
TS	4 B	Message Timestamp.
ES	0x00-0xFF	UAV Emergency Status.

ARID MAVLink Custom Message



ARID ID MAVLink Message Definition 1.0 (common.xml): 0xDE

```
<message id="222" name="ARID_PROTOCOL">
  <description>File transfer message</description>
  <field type="uint8_t" name="target_network">Network ID (0 for broadcast)</field>
  <field type="uint8_t" name="target_system">System ID (0 for broadcast)</field>
  <field type="uint8_t" name="target_component">Component ID (0 for broadcast)</field>
  <field type="uint8_t[251]" name="payload">Variable length payload. The length is defined by
the remaining message length when subtracting the header and other fields. The entire content of this
block is opaque unless you understand any the encoding message_type. The particular encoding used can
be extension specific and might not always be documented as part of the mavlink specification.</field>
</message>
```

Main ARID Functions (1)

Function Name	Description
<code>void ARID_init();</code>	Initialize OpenSSL and PRNG.
<code>static int setupKey(BIGNUM **prv, EC_POINT **pbl, BIGNUM *q, const EC_POINT *G, EC_GROUP *curve, BN_CTX *ctx);</code>	Setup the key material on the device (i.e. load/generate the cryptographic keys)
<code>static void hex_print(const void*, size_t);</code>	Print in HEX the content of a variable
<code>void getPadOneTimeKey(int, int, EC_GROUP *, BN_CTX *, unsigned char *);</code>	Generate One Time Key and Pad the Key for EC Elgamal Encryption Operation
<code>void unPadKey(char *, unsigned int , unsigned char *);</code>	UnPad the Key for EC Elgamal Decryption Operation
<code>int elgamal_encrypt(char **, char *, int , const EC_POINT *, EC_GROUP *, BN_CTX *, BIGNUM *);</code>	EC ElGamal Encryption Function
<code>int elgamal_decrypt(char **, char *, int , BIGNUM *, EC_GROUP *, BN_CTX *);</code>	EC ElGamal Decryption Function

Main ARID Functions (2)

Function Name	Description
<code>void <i>encrypt_decrypt</i>(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, char *, char *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, bool);</code>	AES Encryption/Decryption Algorithm
<code>void <i>clean</i>(EC_GROUP *g, BN_CTX *c, EVP_MD_CTX *h, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc);</code>	Clean the memory and the data structures
<code>double <i>print_time</i>(struct timeval *s, struct timeval *e);</code>	Print the time defined in a timeval structure.
<code>void <i>digest</i>(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *ptr, char *buffer, unsigned char *dig);</code>	Compute the hash of a string. In this case we adopt SHA-256.
<code>int <i>initialize_UDP</i>(int *, struct sockaddr_in *, struct sockaddr_in *, int , int);</code>	Init the socket to receive datagram and support UDP protocol
<code>mavlink_parse_char(chan, buf[i], &msg, &status)</code>	Parse the data stream in order to get a MAVLink message
<code>mavlink_msg_global_position_int_decode(&msg, &gps_position);</code>	Decode data of the message and put it in the variable <code>gps_position</code>

Security Levels and Buffer Lengths

Security Level (bits)	Description
80	With the elliptic curve <i>secp160r1</i> the total size of the MavLink payload is 147 bytes.
96	With the elliptic curve <i>secp192k1</i> the total size of the MavLink payload is 163 bytes.
112	With the elliptic curve <i>secp224k1</i> the total size of the MavLink payload is 179 bytes.
128	With the elliptic curve <i>secp256k1</i> the total size of the MavLink payload is 195 bytes.

- *Payload Computation with 80 bits Security Level*
- RES (3 bytes) + PID (67 bytes) + EKEY (Enc. Public Key 42 bytes) + UAV GPS (12 bytes) + UAV Speed (6 bytes) + GCS GPS (12 bytes) + TS (4 bytes) + Emergency Code (1 byte)
- PID = ID (4 bytes) + EC Signature ASN.1 DER (49 bytes) + TS (4 bytes) + Nonce (10 bytes)

IDE and Compile Syntax

- I used Visual Studio Code on Ubuntu 19.04
- Compile Syntax

```
arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc -I ./mavlink-solo/build/common/ -I /usr/local/openssl/include/ -I /usr/local/include/ -L /usr/local/openssl/lib/ -mcpu=cortex-a9 -o arid arid.c -lcrypto -pthread -Wl,--no-as-needed -ldl -static
```




Visual Studio Code



No GPS for Indoor Test? No Problem

- Configure GPS-SDR-SIM ([https://github.com/osqzss/gps-sim](https://github.com/osqzss/gps-sdr-sim))
- Configure your Software Defined Radio like the HackRF One with an ANT 500 antenna and a TCXO Clock
- Let's go: `hackrf_transfer -t gpssim.bin -f 1575420000 -s 2600000 -a 1 -x 0`



No drone? No worries!



- Install dronekit-sitl with *pip install dronekit-sitl*
- Start dronekit with the following syntax (for details, please type `dronekit-sitl -h`): `dronekit-sitl plane-3.3.0 --home=35.363261,149.165230,584,353`
- In a second terminal spawn an instance of MAVProxy to forward messages from TCP 127.0.0.1:5760 to other UDP ports like 127.0.0.1:14550 and 127.0.0.1:14551

`mavproxy.py --master tcp:127.0.0.1:5760 --sitl 127.0.0.1:5501 --out 127.0.0.1:14550 --out 127.0.0.1:14551`

No drone? No worries!

- First connect and start the python script (an easy way)
- Start the ARID protocol on your computer as: `./arid`
- Open *Wireshark* on your network-card interface to see the broadcasted packets.

```
1 print "Start simulator (SITL)"
2 import dronekit_sitl
3 sitl = dronekit_sitl.start_default()
4 connection_string = sitl.connection_string()
5 from dronekit import connect, VehicleMode
6 print("Connecting to vehicle on: %s" % (connection_string,))
7 vehicle = connect(connection_string, wait_ready=True)
8 print "Get some vehicle attribute values:"
9 print " GPS: %s" % vehicle.gps_0
10 print " Battery: %s" % vehicle.battery
11 print " Last Heartbeat: %s" % vehicle.last_heartbeat
12 print " Is Armable?: %s" % vehicle.is_armable
13 print " System status: %s" % vehicle.system_status.state
14 print " Mode: %s" % vehicle.mode.name # settable
15 vehicle.close()
16 sitl.stop()
17 print("Completed")
```

Change UAV/Drone MAC Address

- It is easy to change the UAV/Drone MAC address.
- You just need to open an SSH session with the drone and execute the script *change_mac.sh* inside the drone before the flight.
- In this case you will not reveal your legitimate MAC address to potential adversaries.




```
ifconfig wlan0 down  
ifconfig wlan0 hw ether 12:34:56:78:12:34  
ifconfig wlan0 up  
ifconfig
```

Dissecting ARID with WireShark


The screenshot displays the Wireshark interface with the following components:

- Packet List:** Shows a series of packets from 845240 to 845254. Packet 845253 is selected, showing a User Datagram Protocol (UDP) packet with source port 14551 and destination port 14550.
- Packet Details:** Shows the structure of the selected packet:
 - Frame 845253: 304 bytes on wire (2432 bits), 304 bytes captured (2432 bits) on interface 0
 - Ethernet II, Src: 00:00:00_00:00:00 (00:00:00:00:00:00), Dst: 00:00:00_00:00:00 (00:00:00:00:00:00)
 - Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 127.0.0.1, Dst: 127.0.0.1
 - User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 14551, Dst Port: 14550
 - Data (262 bytes)
- Packet Bytes:** Shows the raw data of the packet, including the AES key and the encrypted data. The key is 770A121785D8FEE83B2E5992B6938EBE. The encrypted data is 07BB3C0CE7CF2B545BA4C37CAB6C03C46C347699094F3C9A28B8A5096618C22E224703A10675DBD9CC918EB670286D.
- Decryption:** The interface shows the decryption process using the key. The decrypted data is 770A121785D8FEE83B2E5992B6938EBE.




ARID AT WORK!

Performance Assessment



How did you measure the Time?

- Measure the time needed to generate and transmit an ARID packet on the 3DR-Solo
- How? Using the *tic-toc* method inside the C script.
- Average time required to execute ARID over 1,000 tests (with 95% confidence intervals)
- Considering the separate contribution of the processing (packet generation, cryptography operations) and radio operations.
- Note that the measured time spans from the GPS location acquisition to the packet delivery (both included).
- Maximum interarrival time $T = 1$ s recommended by the *RemoteID* rule



```
pietro@pietro: ~/Desktop/arid
Time: 13.393997ms
[INFO] Sending ARID Packet
Time: 13.493685ms
[INFO] Sending ARID Packet
Time: 13.594755ms
[INFO] Sending ARID Packet
Time: 13.694151ms
[INFO] Sending ARID Packet
Time: 13.799184ms
[INFO] Sending ARID Packet
Time: 13.898701ms
[INFO] Sending ARID Packet
Time: 13.998803ms
[INFO] Sending ARID Packet
Time: 14.098784ms
[INFO] Sending ARID Packet
Time: 14.348343ms
[INFO] Sending ARID Packet
Time: 14.504507ms
[INFO] Sending ARID Packet
Time: 14.604584ms
[INFO] Sending ARID Packet
Time: 14.704643ms
```

How did you measure the Energy?



- Telemetry data conveyed by the 3DR-Solo to the remote controller through the MAVLink protocol.
- Measure the difference in the current drained by the drone between: (i) drone at rest; and (ii) during the execution of ARID
- **We computed an average difference of ≈ 20 mA** in the electric current drained by the drone over 1,000 runs
- For the radio operations, the on-board chip of the 3DR-Solo drone belongs to the family AR9300
- 3.3 V, 296.970 mA in TX, 187.879 mA in RX
- IEEE 802.11b, Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) modulation using Differential Binary Phase-Shift Keying (DBPSK)
- Transmission Rate of 1.0 Mbps, 22 MHz channel bandwidth, and a Short Guard Interval of 800 ns.

What about the 20 mA?

The screenshot displays the Mission Planner interface with several key components:

- Top Left:** A heading scale and status indicators. The heading scale is centered at 0 degrees. Status includes "DISARMED", "PreArm: Need 3D Fix", "AS 0.0m/s", "GS 0.0m/s", "Loiter 0m>0", "Bat 15.20v 0.6 A339% EKF Vibe", and "GPS: No Fix".
- Top Right:** "ARDUPILOT" logo, UDP port settings (921600), and a "DISCONNECT" button.
- Left Panel:** Flight data summary:
 - Altitude (m): 1.46
 - GroundSpeed (m/s): 0.00
 - Dist to WP (m): 0.00
 - AirSpeed (m/s): 0.00
 - Vertical Speed (m/s): -0.07
 - DistToMAV: 0.00
- Center Graph:** A "Tuning" graph showing "current (Min: 0.6 Max: 0.63 Mean: 0.61)" on the y-axis (ranging from 0.56 to 0.66) and "Time (s)" on the x-axis (ranging from 787 to 796). A yellow arrow labeled "ARID" points to a sharp spike in the current at approximately 791 seconds.
- Terminal Window:** A PuTTY window titled "10.1.1.10 - PuTTY" showing the execution of the "/arid" command. The output consists of six sequential log messages: "[INFO] Congratulations! Connection established with the UAV.", "[INFO] UDPin: 0.0.0.0:14550", and five "[INFO] Sending ARID Packet" entries with timestamps from 1.000000 s to 6.000000 s.
- Bottom Right:** A map showing the current location over Europe and the Arctic region.


How did you measure the Energy?



- Overall Energy Consumption: $E[mJ] = V \cdot \int_0^T i(t)dt$
- V (15.11 V for the UAV's battery and 3.3 V for the radio chip)
- $i(t)$ the instantaneous drained current (20 mA required by ARID on the UAV's battery and 296.970 mA for the radio chip)

Elliptic Curve	Radio Time (ms)	Comp. Time (ms)	Radio Energy (mJ)	Comp. Energy (mJ)
<i>secp160r1</i>	1.576	3.942 ± 0.0189	1.544	1.191 ± 0.00574
<i>secp192k1</i>	1.704	5.576 ± 0.0286	1.670	1.685 ± 0.00867
<i>secp224k1</i>	1.832	7.781 ± 0.0389	1.795	2.351 ± 0.01176
<i>secp256k1</i>	1.960	9.272 ± 0.0532	1.920	2.802 ± 0.01609







Performance Assessment

Impact of ARID on the battery lifetime. The most energy-consuming configuration of ARID (*secp256k1*) reduces the lifetime of the 3DR-Solo by only **1.05%** compared to the default (non-anonymous) *RemoteID* configuration, further demonstrating its limited overhead.

Energy Consumption




Radio and Computation Time



ARID: Impact on Lifetime

- 1) We executed ARID (*secp256k1*) on the drone with the engines on but without flying. Further we computed the energy consumption!
- 2) We executed the standard *Remote-ID* protocol (no crypto) on the drone with the engines on but without flying. Further we computed the energy consumption!
- 3) The differences between 1) and 2) provides you the energy impact of our protocol.
- 4) Result? **Days and days of noise engine in my head** (even with the headphones)!




ARID: Impact on Lifetime (True Story)



Conclusion and Future Work

- Fully compliant with the latest *RemoteID* regulations by the FAA
- We plan to generalize ARID for other domains in our future work (avionics and maritime networks)
- See you in the main conference ACSAC 21 for more details 😊
- Proof of Concept released as Open Source @ <https://github.com/pietrotedeschi/arid>





Any Questions?

THANK
YOU !



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