Global Feature Analysis and Comparative Evaluation of Freestyle In-Air-Handwriting Passcode for User Authentication

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Secure Networking And Computing Research Group

Freestyle In-Air-Handwriting Passcode



System Architecture



Devices and Signals



the camera device

the glove device

Preprocessing



System Architecture



Datasets

dataset	# signals	description					
ID-passcode	7,200	Legitimate users create two meaningful strings as an ID and a passcode.					
collision	36,000	Imposters attack with the knowledge of string meaning.					
spoofing	18,000	Imposters attack based on watching recorded videos of legitimate users.					
persistence	8,000	Ten sessions of data of legitimate users writing the ID and the passcode.					

We constructed four datasets using two types of devices from 180 users.

Our dataset and code library is openly available at https://github.com/duolu/fmkit

Feature Extraction and Matching

Five different types of features are extracted and five corresponding matching scores are computed.

(1) Alignment cost: δ_{AC}

(2) Signal sample distance: δ_{TTV}

(3) Signal statistical difference: δ_{SD}

(4) Signal length difference: δ_{LD}

(5) Hand geometry difference: δ_{HGD}

Alignment Cost

Given the segment [i'_s, i'_e] of the signal is aligned to the ith sample of the template, $\delta_{AC} = \sum_{i=1}^{r} i - \frac{i'_s + i'_e}{2}$



warping path example

alignment example

Signal Sample Distance



Signal Sample Distance Analysis



Analysis on multiple sensor axes.

Analysis along time.

The signal sample distance feature can be used to distinguish different writers and contents.

Statistical Feature

$f(R) = (\mathbf{M}, \boldsymbol{\Sigma}, \mathbf{P}, \boldsymbol{\Lambda}, \mathbf{L})$

- Mean: Mean of each sensor axis, $\mathbf{M} = (\mu_1, ..., \mu_d)$, where $\mu_i = \text{mean}(\mathbf{S}_i)$.
- Variance: Variance of each sensor axis, $\Sigma = (\sigma_1, ..., \sigma_d)$, where $\sigma_i = var(S_i)$.
- **Correlation:** Correlation among sensor axes, $P = (\alpha_{xy}, \alpha_{yz}, \alpha_{xz}, \beta_{xy}, \beta_{yz}, \beta_{xz}, \dots)$, where α_{xy} , β_{xy} , γ_{xy} is the correlation of acc, gyro, Euler axis x and y
- **Amplitude**: Sum of amplitude of each axis, $\Lambda = (\lambda_1, ..., \lambda_d)$, where $\lambda_i = \Sigma |S_{ij}|$.
- **LF-ratio:** Portion of low frequency components (below 3 Hz), $\mathbf{H} = (\eta_1, ..., \eta_d)$,

Statistical Feature Difference & Length Difference

$$\delta_{SD} = mean(abs(f(R) - \boldsymbol{\mu}_{SF}) / \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{SF})$$

$$\delta_{LD} = |l_R - l_T|/l_T$$

 $\boldsymbol{\mu}_{SF} = mean(f(R^{(1)}), f(R^{(2)}), ..., f(R^{(m)})) \qquad \qquad \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{SF} = std(f(R^{(1)}), f(R^{(2)}), ..., f(R^{(m)}))$



Hand Geometry Difference

$$\delta_{HGD} = mean(abs(\mathbf{h}_R - \mathbf{h}_T)/\mathbf{h}_T)$$

Only available for the camera device.





(a) definition of hand geometry features

(b) length difference of each hand geometry component

Generally, alignment cost, statistical differences, length differences, and hand geometry differences are weak features.

Fusion of Features



Comparison with the Two Types of Devices

	the camera device							the glove device								
	using data from the camera device								using data from the glove device							
method	without collision (in %)			1	with collision (in %)			without collision (in %)				with collision (in %)				
	FED	FAR	FAR	Zero	Zero	FED	FAR	Zero	FFD	FAR	FAR	Zero	Zero	FED	FAR	Zero
	LER	1K	10K	FAR	FRR	LLK	1K	FAR	LLK	1K	10K	FAR	FRR	LLK	1K	FAR
DTW(2)	1.24	5.75	17.69	71.40	28.76	5.10	27.6	37.2	1.24	3.80	10.52	49.46	98.18	5.04	24.0	38.9
TTV(2)	1.00	4.81	12.18	44.57	16.49	3.64	19.9	37.2	1.12	2.97	7.30	48.84	50.97	4.17	23.0	38.9
DTW	0.81	2.39	7.56	56.36	25.00	3.08	13.3	29.5	0.75	1.33	5.26	43.80	8.56	2.95	12.0	19.6
TTV	0.70	2.38	7.99	23.64	15.54	2.16	15.2	34.8	0.68	0.85	2.86	35.50	11.23	2.39	13.6	23.6
S-Fusion	0.50	1.38	4.95	37.75	42.38	1.83	7.4	15.4	0.39	0.93	2.06	36.12	16.21	1.98	15.6	30.9
T-Fusion	0.22	0.32	0.78	12.33	7.35	2.61	10.9	17.0	0.16	0.16	0.39	2.95	6.57	1.51	4.7	6.2
F-Fusion	0.26	0.31	0.85	12.00	7.30	2.61	10.7	16.6	0.16	0.16	0.39	3.10	4.25	1.51	4.4	5.6
T-Fusion(A)	0.21	0.23	0.57	10.62	3.23	2.74	10.6	23.2	0.16	0.16	0.42	2.79	0.50	1.86	6.5	12.2
T-Fusion(E)	0.10	0.12	0.78	10.70	4.72	2.40	8.91	18.3	0.16	0.16	0.39	2.02	2.29	1.38	3.5	5.1

The performances with the two types of devices are close.

Performance Results (ROC)



Roughly one or two mistakes over one thousand authentication attempts at best.

Comparison with Existing Works

Pof	number	EER	EER	Dovico	Algorithm	
Kel.	of users	(w/o collision)	(w/ collision)	Device		
Ours (camera)	180	$0.10\% \sim 1.24\%$	$1.83\% \sim 5.10\%$	Leap Motion	SVM, TTV, DTW	
Ours (glove)	180	$0.16\% \sim 1.24\%$	$1.38\% \sim 5.04\%$	custom data glove	SVM, TTV, DTW	
Liu et al.[17]	$20 \sim 25$	~ 3%	$\sim \! 10\%$	Wii remote	DTW	
Bailador et al.[2]	96	$1.8\% \sim 2.1\%$	$\sim 5\%$	smartphone	DTW, Bayes, HMM	
Bashir et al.[3]	40	~1.8%	N/A	custom digital pen	DTW	
Chan et al.[6]	16	0.8%	N/A	Leap Motion	random forest	
Tian et al.[31]	18	$\sim 2\%$	N/A	Kinect	DTW	

Our methods have slightly larger datasets and better performance.

Our work provides more comprehensive comparative evaluations and analyses.

Analysis of Scores for All Accounts



accounts (sorted by same-max)

Easy Cases and Hard Cases



(a) same, $\delta = 0.187$ (easy)





(b) same, δ = 0.524 (<mark>hard</mark>)



(d) collision, $\delta = 0.555$ (easy)

(e) diff, $\delta = 0.294$ (hard)

(c) same, $\delta = 0.566$ (hard)



(f) diff, $\delta = 0.373$ (hard)

More Analysis

- Analysis with active spoofing attacks.
- Analysis of persistent performance with data from multiple sessions.
- Analysis of usability.



Our work analyzes the strength and limitations in various scenarios.

Long-Term Performance Analysis



Our work analyzes the long-term performance.



Thank you!

More details are available in our paper and at https://github.com/duolu/fmkit

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