# **Beyond Blockchain Basics**

### Lessons Learned and Next Steps from 3+ Years of R&D and Implementations



Homeland Security

Science and Technology

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**Technical Director** 

## DHS S&T's 3+ Years of R&D Investments ... ... to Understand Blockchain's Relevance to HSE

|                  | <ul> <li>Confidentiality, Integrity,</li> </ul>                                   |         | DHS S&T R&D Programs                                              |
|------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Security and     | Availability                                                                      |         | Celerity Government Solutions, LLC                                |
| Privacy          | Pseudonymous Operations,     Soloctive Disclosure                                 |         | Digital Bazaar, Inc.                                              |
|                  | Selective Disclosure                                                              |         | Narf Industries, LLC                                              |
|                  |                                                                                   |         | <ul> <li>Respect Network Corporation &gt; Evernym, Inc</li> </ul> |
| Intogration      | Data Sharing Implications On                                                      |         | <ul> <li>SecureKey Technologies, Inc.</li> </ul>                  |
| Annroaches &     | Chain vs. Off-Chain                                                               | ion vs. | DHS S&T Silicon Valley Innovation Program                         |
| Gain/Pain        | <ul> <li>Storage of Information vs.</li> <li>Validation of Information</li> </ul> |         | • Factom, Inc.                                                    |
|                  |                                                                                   |         |                                                                   |
|                  |                                                                                   |         |                                                                   |
| Digital Currency | Anonymous Currencies                                                              |         |                                                                   |

Anonymous Networks



**Forensics** 

# R&D Execution Model to Support Potential DHS m Blockchain Operational Deployments





### Lessons Learned from R&D Investments Blockchain ≠ Blockchain ≠ Blockchain

### An authoritative book of records ...

- With many copies that are kept synchronized
- In which multiple parties can create individual records
- Using consensus to determine the validity and order of written records
- Where each record is linked to the prior one
- Ensuring that written records cannot be modified or deleted without alerting the readers of the book





### Lessons Learned from R&D Investments Most Organizations Don't Need A Blockchain



### Lessons Learned from R&D Investments No Common Set of Security & Privacy Defaults

### Many Different Types of Distributed Ledgers (Blockchains) – Security & Privacy

| Principle                | Bitcoin                         | Ethereum                                              | Stellar                                               | IPFS                                 | Blockstack                                                        | Hashgraph                                         |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|
| Confidentiality          | None                            | None                                                  | None                                                  | Hash-based<br>content addresses      | None                                                              | None                                              |
| Information Availability | Block Mirroring                 | Block Mirroring                                       | Ledger Mirroring                                      | Graph and file<br>Mirroring          | Block Mirroring /<br>DHT Mirroring                                | Hashgraph<br>Mirroring; optional<br>event history |
| Integrity                | Multiple block<br>verifications | Multiple block<br>verifications                       | Latest block<br>verification                          | Hash-based<br>content<br>addressing  | Multiple block<br>verifications                                   | Consensus with probability one                    |
| Non-repudiation          | Digital signatures              | Digital signatures                                    | Digital signatures                                    | Digital signatures                   | Digital signatures                                                | Digital signatures                                |
| Provenance               | Transaction<br>inputs/outputs   | Ethereum state<br>machine and transition<br>functions | Digitally signed<br>ledger transition<br>instructions | Digital signatures<br>and versioning | Transaction inputs<br>& outputs and<br>virtualchain<br>references | Hashgraph<br>Mirroring; optional<br>event history |
| Pseudonymity             | Public keys                     | Public keys and contract addresses                    | Public keys                                           | Public keys                          | Public keys, but<br>public information<br>encouraged              | Not supported;<br>could be layered                |
| Selective Disclosure     | None                            | None                                                  | None                                                  | None                                 | Selective access<br>to encrypted<br>storage                       | Not supported;<br>could be layered                |



- Research results from S&T funded R&D conducted in 2016 by Digital Bazaar

### Lessons Learned from R&D Investments Varying Degrees of Performance

### Many Different Types of Distributed Ledgers (Blockchains) – Performance

| Principle                       | Bitcoin                                     | Ethereum                                       | Stellar                                                             | IPFS                                                                                                 | Blockstack                               | Hashgraph                                                                                                 |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Consistency                     | Block verifications.<br>30-60 minutes       | Block verifications. 20-<br>60 minutes         | Single block<br>verification. Less<br>than 1 minute                 | P2P mirroring. Limited primarily by<br>network I/O. Several seconds for<br>files less than 128KB.    | Block verifications. 30-<br>60 minutes   | Consensus with probability one;<br>Byzantine agreement, but attackers<br>must control less than one-third |
| System Availability             | Block verifications.<br>30-60 minutes       | Block verifications. 20-<br>60 minutes         | Single block<br>verification. Less<br>than 1 minute.                | Single storage request response.<br>Several seconds for files less than<br>128KB                     | Block verifications. 30-<br>60 minutes   | Virtual voting; DoS resistant w/o proof-<br>of-work, fast gossip                                          |
| Failure Tolerance               | Longest chain wins                          | Longest chain wins                             | Last balloted block<br>always has<br>consensus.                     | Content address hash. Highly<br>resilient against network<br>partitioning                            | Longest chain wins                       | Strong Byzantine fault tolerance                                                                          |
| Scalability                     | Block size. 7<br>transactions per<br>second | Block size. 7-20<br>transactions per<br>second | Thousands to tens of<br>thousands of<br>transactions per<br>second. | Thousands to tens of thousands of<br>transactions per second. Scales<br>linearly as nodes are added. | Block size. 7<br>transactions per second | Thousands to tens of thousands of transactions per second. Limited by bandwidth only                      |
| Latency                         | Block verifications.<br>30-60 minutes       | Block verifications. 20-<br>60 minutes         | Single block<br>verification. Less<br>than 1 minute.                | Single storage request response.<br>Several seconds for files less than<br>128KB.                    | Block verifications. 30-<br>60 minutes   | Virtual voting; limited only by exponentially fast gossip protocol                                        |
| Auditability                    | Full                                        | Full                                           | Full                                                                | Difficult                                                                                            | Full                                     | Configurable                                                                                              |
| Liveliness                      | Full                                        | Full                                           | Full                                                                | Fails if nodes storing data fail                                                                     | Full                                     | Full                                                                                                      |
| Denial of Service<br>Resistance | Spend Bitcoin                               | Spend Ether                                    | Spend Stellar                                                       | Files are only mirrored if requested                                                                 | Spend Bitcoin                            | Signed State / Proof-of-stake / < 1/3<br>attackers                                                        |
| System Complexity               | Medium                                      | High                                           | Medium                                                              | Medium                                                                                               | Medium High                              | Low, but not full system                                                                                  |



- Research results from S&T funded R&D conducted in 2016 by Digital Bazaar

### POC: Immutable Logging to Ensure Resiliency, Integrity and Independent Validation of IoT Device and Sensor Data

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DHS S&T and CBP/Border Patrol proof of concept on imagery and sensors involving the Internet of Things (IoT) Security. This project captured and made clear the architecture choices and design decisions inherent in building an immutable record of data coming from cameras, sensors and IoT devices.

S&T conducts its projects over multiple phases to minimize project and technical risk and this project is beginning deployment in an operational environment in partnership with CBP/Border Patrol.

# POC: Streamlining and Enhancing International Trade Facilitation via Free Trade Agreements

- Negotiated exchange of goods sanctioned by participating countries for improved trade
- Cumbersome paper process done in a post audit world where some participants have automation
- What are we testing?
  - Interoperability specifications
  - Segregated/Hybrid approach to Blockchain data
  - Safeguarding data against corporate breach, but utilizing Blockchain for generic data and status
  - Advancements over paper and automation processes
- POC Assessment Goals for DHS CBP and S&T
  - Legal
  - Policy
  - Technical





### Lessons Learned/Validated by POC Implementations If You Do Need A Blockchain, Be Aware ...

- Permissioned and private distributed ledger technologies may be more suitable for leveraging existing business relationships and regulatory frameworks which are the majority of USG use cases
- Architecture and design cannot be hand-waved away (but often is in the race for market share!)
  - Integration points with existing environments
  - What is stored on-chain vs. off-chain? Public on-chain pointers to private off-chain data stores?
  - Private ledgers that can be anchored in public blockchains?
- There is no one-size-fits-all ledger data format, and standards for how to create the "data payload" that is written to a ledger are critical to interoperability across Blockchain implementations
- Distributed key management is not a solved problem, but needs to be for scalable deployment
- Immutability of records combined with encryption as a privacy tool is gated by the reality that **encryption has a time to live** which will eventually run out; this has real privacy and design implications
- Smart contracts are relatively immature and the contract execution environment must balance the security needs of the node with providing a richer (more error-prone) language



### Enabling a Competitive, Diverse and Interoperable Blockchain / DLT Marketplace

Funding, Championing and Using Globally Interoperable Standards and Specifications (pre-cursor to Standards)

Investing in Customer Driven Proof-of-Concepts to Identify Integration Points and Gain/Pain Ratio

Addressing Discovered Challenges



### Championing Globally Interoperable Specifications **Decentralized Identifiers**

- Globally Unique Identifier without the need for a central registration authority
  - Immutable
    - Identifier is permanent
  - Resolvable
    - Identifier can be looked up to identify metadata about entity it identifies
  - Cryptographically Verifiable
    - Identifier's ownership can be established and verified using public/private cryptographic keys

**Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) v0.10** 

Data Model and Syntaxes for Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs)



#### Draft Community Group Report 31 May 2018

| late | est editor's draft.                 |
|------|-------------------------------------|
|      | https://w3c-ccg.github.io/did-spec/ |
| Edit | tors:                               |
|      | Drummond Reed (Evernym)             |
|      | Manu Sporny (Digital Bazaar)        |
| Aut  | hors:                               |
|      | Drummond Reed (Evernym)             |
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|      | Dave Longley (Digital Bazaar)       |
|      | Christopher Allen (Blockstream)     |
|      | Ryan Grant                          |
|      | Markus Sabadello (Danube Tech)      |
| Par  | ticipate:                           |
|      | GitHub w3c-ccg/did-spec             |
|      | File a bug                          |
|      | Commit history                      |
|      | Pull requests                       |
|      |                                     |

Copyright © 2018 the Contributors to the Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) v0.10 Specification, published by the Credentials Community Group under the W3C Community Contributor License Agreement (CLA). A human-readable summary is available.

#### Abstract

Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) are a new type of identifier for verifiable, "self-sovereign" digital identity. DIDs are fully under the control of the DID subject, independent from any centralized registry, identity provider, or certificate authority. DIDs are URLs that relate a DID subject to means for trustable interactions with that subject. DIDs resolve to DID Documents - simple documents that describe how to use that specific DID. Each DID Document contains at least three things: cryptographic material, authentication suites, and service endpoints. Cryptographic material combined with authentication suites provide a set of mechanisms to authenticate as the DID subject (e.g. public keys, pseudonymous biometric protocols, etc.). Service endpoints enable trusted interactions with the DID subject.



This document specifies a common data model, format, and operations that all DIDs support

### Championing Globally Interoperable Specifications Verifiable Credentials

- Interoperability across issuers, holders and verifiers
  - Standardization of data formats
  - Standardization of digital signature schemes
- Digital version of physical credentials/attestations
  - Driver's Licenses
  - Passports
  - Training Certificates
  - Educational Certificates

Verifiable Credentials Data Model 1.0 Expressing verifiable information on the Web



#### W3C Editor's Draft 13 June 2018

This version: https://w3c.github.io/vc-data-model/ Latest published version: https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model/ Latest editor's draft: https://w3c.github.io/vc-data-model/ Editors: Manu Sporny (Digital Bazaar) Daniel C. Burnett (Invited Expert) Dave Longley (Digital Bazaar) Gregg Kellogg (Spec-Ops) Authors: Manu Sporny (Digital Bazaar) Dave Longley (Digital Bazaar) Participate: GitHub w3c/vc-data-model File a bug Commit history Pull requests

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#### Abstract

Credentials are a part of our daily lives; driver's licenses are used to assert that we are capable of operating a motor vehicle, university degrees can be used to assert our level of education, and government-issued passports enable holders to travel between countries. This specification provides a mechanism to express these sorts of credentials on the Web in a way that is cryptographically secure, privacy respecting, and machine-verifiable.

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### Championing Globally Interoperable Specifications Multi-Party Distributed Key Management

- Tackling the hard challenge of distributed key management
  - Provisioning
  - Revocation
  - Re-Issuance
- Supports Cross-Enterprise Managed Deployments
- Using NIST Special Publication 800-130: A Framework for Cryptographic Key Management Systems as a starting point
- Potential Path to Standardization TBD





### CBP Adoption of S&T Championed Blockchain Interoperability Specifications as a US Customs Standard



U.S. Customs and Border Protection

#### AUG 0 8 2018

MEMORANDUM FOR:

John P. Sanders Chief Operating Officer

Brenda B. Smith Bunde Be

Executive Assistant Commissioner Office of Trade

Kathryn Kolbe Kulle Executive Assistant Commissioner

Enterprise Services

Phil Landfried

Assistant Commissioner ( Office of Information and Technology DHS S&T has invested over three years of time, money, and effort into researching the specifications necessary to allow multiple blockchains to interact with each other. Interoperability allows the government to remain impartial toward which blockchain software is utilized by our trade partners and removes the need for CBP to continuously build customized Application Program Interfaces to communicate with users of other technology.

#### **Proposed Path Forward:**

The Office of Trade (OT) and the Office of Information and Technology (OIT) jointly recommend that:

- CBP adopt the specifications developed and championed by DHS S&T as a CBP standard.
- OT and OIT jointly engage other U.S. Government stakeholders, such as the DHS Chief Information Officer (CIO), the White House CIO Council, and others, to push for broader adoption of these standards and to develop an effective "whole of government" approach towards this use-case of blockchain technology.

SUBJECT:

FROM:

Setting Standards for Blockchain/Distributed Ledger Technology

# Challenge: Mitigating Forgery & Counterfeiting of Monopole Contractions of Contract of Con

- Person-ownership of verifiable claims and certificates
- Selective disclosure of claim information with the Person's consent
- Pluralism of operators and technologies
- Support for online and off-line presentation of claim
- Non-CRL based revocation methods (Issuer initiated, Person initiated and/or Multi-sig based) that removes issuer dependency
- Very high resistance to data deletion, modification, masking or tampering





### DHS S&T Silicon Valley Innovation Program Preventing Forgery & Counterfeiting of Licenses & Certificates



### Preventing Forgery & Counterfeiting of Certificates and Licenses

SVIP Call # 70RSAT19R0000002 Application Deadline (1<sup>st</sup>): 11 Jan, 2019

> Register Now to Attend Industry Day 11 Dec, 2018 @ Menlo Park, CA, USA

- DHS Operational Components (CBP, TSA, USCIS etc.) need to issue, validate and verify entitlements, attestations and certificates
  - Travel
  - Citizenship and Immigration Status
  - Employment Eligibility
  - More ...
- Current issuance processes are paper based, non-interoperable and susceptible to loss, destruction, forgery, and counterfeiting
- Seeking digital solutions for:
  - Issuance, Validation and Verification of Certificates, Licenses and Attestations
  - Storage and Management of Certificates, Licenses and Attestations
  - Consolidating Decentralized and Derived PIV Credentials



### Conclusions and Considerations

- Potential for the development of "walled gardens" or closed technology platforms that do not support common standards for security, privacy, and data exchange
- Interoperability requires addressing architecture, protocol, payload and policy aspects of any solution
  - Need investments in globally interoperable standards
  - Standards must be informed by lessons learned from business driven proof of concepts
- Rip-n-Replace is NOT a successful path to Enterprise Integration
  - Thoughtful, creative, system architectures and design play crucial roles when it comes to meeting the Gain to Pain ratio threshold of any Enterprise adoption
  - Data privacy continues to be a critical component of any distributed solution
  - Customer driven Proof of Concept implementations are in process to determine if the technology gains outweigh the process change & integration pain necessary for adoption
- Interoperable Decentralized Identifiers, Data Exchange Standards & Distributed key management are not solved problems
  - These have both technology and standards components that need to be addressed
  - Scalable deployment needs solution diversity to prevent vendor tech lock-in



DHS S&T is making targeted R&D investments to close the above identified capability gaps. We look forward to collaborating with other stakeholders who have shared interests!



# Homeland Security

Science and Technology

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