



Empirical Evaluation of API Usability and Security

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Outline

- Project Vision
- Background
- Approach and Progress
- Summary



Project Aims and Vision

Our project will develop and empirically test *concrete* and *actionable* API design principles that lead to more secure code

Long-term vision: To empirically evaluate secure development practices

- Many decades of work on secure development practices, most of it based upon experience and reflections by smart people
 - Including many thousands of pages of secure coding guideline books
- Little, if any, information about validity and relative merit of different practices
 - “Common Sense” is often wrong
 - Necessary to improve practices, make cost/benefit decisions, decide between competing guidelines

Principle: Programmers and designers are people, too.

- Need to design systems that people can securely code to



Why APIs?

APIs have large impact upon system security

- C String library still major cause of problems
- See Wang et al, “Explicating SDKs: Uncovering Assumptions Underlying Secure Authentication and Authorization”

APIs are long-lasting

APIs are generally designed by a small number of more-experienced people

Note: We are making little distinction between APIs, SDKs, and language features

- Examples:
 - concurrency is built-in to Java, but thought of as a library in C (although compiler-writers disagree with this)
 - C++’s `const` and Java’s `final` have different semantics – we will examine the control of mutations, irrespective of language choices



Project Decisions and Goals

Will concentrate on usability and security of *non-security-related* APIs

- Threat model: programmers are well-meaning, not malicious, but code that they write subject to malicious attacks
- Interested in security impact when programmers are thinking of functionality, **not** security

Goals:

- Actionable and specific guidance to API designers about
 - The impact of API design decisions on security
 - The interaction between usability and security
- Guidance to language designers about language features that affect ability of API designers to express important properties
- Accepted methodology for research in this area



Concrete Motivating Issue -- Mutability

Mutability: whether or not an object's state can be modified after creation

Security community values immutability of objects:

- Oracle: “Maximum reliance on immutable objects is widely accepted as a sound strategy for creating simple, reliable code”
- Java security guidelines stress additional work required for mutable objects
- Closely related to TOCTOU attacks
 - Object's state should not be able to be changed between check and use



Empirical Usability Research on Mutability

Stylos and Clarke: “Usability Implications of Requiring Parameters in Objects’ Constructors”

Two fundamental patterns for object constructors:

1. Required-constructor:

```
foo = new FooClass(arg1, arg2);
```

2. Create-set-call:

```
foo = new FooClass();
```

```
foo.setArg1(arg1);
```

```
foo.setArg2(arg2);
```

Create-set-call implies objects must be mutable



Details

Experiments done using thirty professional programmers in lab

- Both creating own APIs, and using supplied APIs in different styles
- Methodology:
 - Gave programmers description of task, then asked them what code they would expect to write
 - Asked to design own API
 - Then gave them (sequentially) different tasks. In some tasks, only one style API was given to each programmer, in others they had to create objects of both kinds.
 - Interviewed participants afterwards.
- Consistently and strongly preferred create-set-call style, and more effective
 - Required-constructor interfered with common learning techniques, less flexible



Usability vs security

Apparent trade-off between usability and security wrt mutability

- Is this real? Can we measure?

Guesses:

- Usability and security sometimes aligned, sometimes not
 - Concurrency probably both factors aligned



Methodology and Project Plans

Initial focus on mutability

- Isolating mutability from concurrency

Stage 1: Construction of measurable hypotheses


- Literature/corpus search for immutability usage and impact
- Structured interviews with key designers
- Interviews/surveys of professional programmers

Stage 2: Lab studies

- Students and/or professional programmers
- Controlled experiments
 - Start with controlled elicitation of how programmer thinks code *should* be written
 - Give tasks with alternate APIs
 - Use think-aloud protocol
 - Within-subject design: all subjects use all APIs



Example Lab Study



Candidate usability measures:

- Effort
- Correctness
- Subjective rating

Candidate security measures:

- Avoidance of known (seeded) vulnerabilities



Summary

Doing empirical investigations of usability and security impacts of API designs

- Starting with object mutability

Intended results:

- Concrete and actionable guidance to API and language designers
- Methodology for user-studies of security development methodologies



Threats to Validity

1. Study duration

- Studies necessarily limited in time
- Real-life performance involves multiple factors
 - Initial code creation
 - Code modification ease
 - Testability
 - Communication between programmers
- We argue that increasing study duration is not as critical as isolating strands of overall development quality and productivity

2. Programmer variability

- Controlled by within-subjects methodology
- Will track programmer expertise

3. Security/Usability dimensionality

- Multiple dimensions to each
- Qualitative feedback will help us realize more subtle aspects

