

#### Automating Compliance Checking, Vulnerability Management, and Security Measurement

Peter Mell and Stephen Quinn

**Computer Security Division** 

NIST





#### A DISA, NSA, and NIST Partnership Sponsored by DHS



National Institute of Standards and Technology

# Outline

- Security Content Automation Program
  - Objectives and Benefits
  - FISMA and DOD Compliance Automation – How and why
  - Enabling Automation Through Integration of Government and Industry Programs
  - Technical Approach
  - Status


# High Level Objectives


- Enable technical control compliance automation
  - Low level vulnerability checks to map to high level compliance requirements
- Enable standardized vulnerability management
  - Empower security product vendor community to perform on-demand, Government directed security and compliance audits
  - End user organization can specify requirements
  - COTS tools automatically perform checks
- Enable security measurement
  - FISMA scorecard have a quantitative component that map to actual low level vulnerabilities

#### Additional Security Content Automation Program Objectives


- Replace Stove-pipe GOTS Approaches
- Establish vulnerability management standards
- Encourage product vendors (i.e. Microsoft, Sun, Oracle, Red Hat etc.) to provide direct support in the form of security guidance/content.

#### Covering the Vulnerability Landscape





#### SCAP CONOPS- Phase I (continued...)



# **Introductory Benefits**

Federal Agencies



- Automation of technical control compliance (FISMA)
- Ability of agencies to specify how systems are to be secured
- Ability to measure security using standardized methods
- COTS Tool Vendors
  - Vendors compete on quality of tool, not the checking content
  - Provision of an enhanced IT security data repository
    - No cost and license free
    - Standards based: CVE/OVAL/XCCDF/CVSS/CCE
    - Cover both software flaw and configuration issues
  - Elimination of duplication of effort/Cost reduction through standardization

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# Let's Talk Compliance



### Trying to be Accommodating



#### Guidance without Substance



### The Right Path?



### Rushing to Comply



### Some Things are Obvious



### Some Things are Confusing



#### Some Things Seem Misplaced



# The Current Quagmire...


- Agency must secure system
  - Much of this is implementing and monitoring low level security settings
    - Ensure secure OS/Application installations (e.g., secure images)
    - Vulnerability mitigation/Patch application
    - Security monitoring
  - Insufficient funding available
- Agency much comply with regulations
  - Higher level security controls
  - Requires low level operational security to be performed but often implemented as a paperwork exercise
  - Consumes large amounts of resources

# **Compliance & Security**

- Problem Comply with policy.
- How Follow recommended guidelines So many to choose from.
- Customize to your environment So many to address.
- Document your exceptions I've mixed and matched, now what?
- Ensure someone reads your exceptions Standardized reporting format.
- Should be basic:
  - One coin, different sides.
  - If I configure my system to compliance regulation does is mean its secure and vice versa?

# The Compliance Game

Every high level policy should ultimately map to low level settings




### The Compliance Answer

- Reduce high level security requirements (e.g., 800-53 controls)?
- Congress provides more resources?



#### **FISMA Compliance Model**



#### It is not possible to manually get from 30,000 ft to ground zero, automated security techniques must be employed

# **Common FISMA Statements**

- While FISMA compliance is important, it can be complex and demanding.
- "Can parts of FISMA compliance be streamlined and automated"?
- "My organization spends more money on compliance than remediation".

#### **Fundamental FISMA Questions**

What are the NIST Technical Security Controls?


What are the <u>Specific</u> NIST recommended settings for individual technical controls?


How do I implement the recommended setting for technical controls? Can I use my COTS Product?

Am I compliant to NIST Recs & Can I use my COTS Product?


Will I be audited against the same criteria I used to secure my systems?

#### **FISMA** Documents






# How Security Automation Helps



### How Does This Work?



# Number of Controls with Automated Validation Support

Cyber Security Assessment and Mgmt	Full Automation Partial Automation	21 (13%) 28 (17%)
Security Content Automation Program	Full Automation:	<b>31</b> (19%)
Machine-readable Security Report Formats	Partial Automation:	39 (24%)
Future Automation Technic or No Automation	ques	44 (27%)
	Total Controls	163 (100%)

#### Inside The Numbers

- Importance/Priority
  - Securely configuring an IT system is of great importance.
- Complexity of Implementation
  - Provide Common Framework
  - Some controls require system-specific technical knowledge not always available in personnel.

#### Labor

 Some Controls (i.e. AC-3, CM-6, etc.) require thousands of specific checks to ensure compliance.

# On the Schedule

- Windows Vista \*
- Windows XP \*
- Windows 2003 \*
- Windows 2000
- Red Hat Enterprise Linux \*
- Oracle
- Sun
- Windows desktop applications
- Web servers

#### \* = Some beta content is available

# Mappings To Policy & Identifiers

- FISMA Security Controls (All 17 Families and 163 controls for reporting reasons)
- DoD IA Controls
- CCE Identifiers (configuration issues)
- CVE Identifiers (software flaw issues)
- CVSS Scoring System (vulnerability impact)
- DISA Vulnerability Management System
   Gold Disk
- NSA References
- Vendor References
- etc.

# **NIST** Publications

- NIST Checklist Publication (Revised Special Publication 800-70)
- NIST IR National Security Automation Program
- NIST IR 7275 XCCDF version 1.1.2 (Draft Posted)

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# Combining Existing Initiatives

#### DISA

- STIG & Checklist Content
- Gold Disk & VMS Research
- FIRST
  - Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS)
- MITRE
  - Common Vulnerability Enumeration (CVE)
  - Common Configuration Enumeration (CCE)
  - Open Vulnerability & Assessment Language (OVAL)

#### NIST

- National Vulnerability Database
- Checklist Program
- Security Content Automation Program

#### NSA

- Extensible Configuration Checklist Description Format (XCCDF)
- Security Guidance & Content



# **Existing NIST Products**



- National Vulnerability Database
  - -2.5 million hits per month
  - 16 new vulnerabilities per day
  - Integrated standards:
- Checklist Program
  - 115 separate guidance documents
  - Covers 140 IT products









#### National Vulnerability Database

- NVD is a comprehensive cyber security vulnerability database that:
  - Integrates all publicly available U.S. Government vulnerability resources
  - Provides references to industry resources.
  - It is based on and synchronized with the CVE vulnerability naming standard.
  - XML feed for all CVEs
  - http://nvd.nist.gov





Sponsored by DHS National Cyber Security Division/US-CERT



#### National Vulnerability Database

a comprehensive cyber vulnerability resource

Search CVE, Download CVE, Statistics, CVSS, Vendors, Contact, FAQ

Welcome to NVD!!	Search CVE Vulnerability Database (Perform Advanced Search)		
NVD is a comprehensive cyber security vulnerability database that integrates all publicly available U.S. Government vulnerability resources and provides references to industry resources. It is based on and synchronized with the <u>CVE</u> vulnerability naming standard.	Keyword search: Try a product or vendor name Try a <u>CVE</u> standard vulnerability name or <u>OVAL</u> query Only vulnerabilities that match ALL keywords will be returned Linux kernel vulnerabilities are categorized separately from vulnerabilities in specific Linux distributions		
	Search last 3 months       Search last 3 years         Show only vulnerabilities that have the following associated resources:       US-CERT <u>Vulnerability Notes</u> OVAL Queries		
Resource Status	Automated FISMA and Compliance Metrics (NSA/DISA/NIST Beta Site)!! The <u>Security Content Automation Program</u> (SCAP) is a public free repository of security content to be used for automating technical control compliance activities (e.g. FISMA/800- 53), vulnerability checking (both application misconfigurations and software flaws), and security measurement.		
NVD contains: 20691 CVE Vulnerabilities 75 US-CERT <u>Alerts</u> 1698 US-CERT Vuln			
<u>Notes</u> 2966 <u>Oval</u> Queries <b>Last updated:</b> 11/27/06 <b>Publication rate:</b> 16 vulnerabilities / day	NVD announces a <u>new service</u> to allow software development organizations to make official statements regarding the set of <u>CVE</u> vulnerabilities that apply to their products. They can now provide the CVE community (300+ products and services) deeper insight into the vulnerabilities within their products. For example, they can dispute third party vulnerability information, clarify vulnerability applicability, provide configuration and remediation		

	tabase - Microsoft Internet Explorer	
<u>File E</u> dit <u>V</u> iew F <u>a</u> vorites ]		
🌀 Back 🝷 🕥 🕤 🗾 🕻	💈 🏠 🔎 Search 🤺 Favorites 🥝 🔗 - 🌺 🕋 - 📙 鑬	
Address 🕘 http://nvd.nist.gov/nv	rd.cfm?startrow=1	🔽 🄁 Go 🛛 Links 🎽 📆
a comprehensiv	Vulnerability Database	
	, <u>Statistics, CVSS, Contact, FAQ</u>	
Welcome to NVD!! NVD is a comprehensive	There are <b>28</b> matching records. Displaying matches <b>1</b> through <b>20</b> . Next 20 Matches	
cyber security vulnerability database	<u>CVE-2006-0012</u> <u>TA06-101A VU#641460</u>	
that integrates all publicly available U.S. Government vulnerability resources and provides references to industry resources. It is based on and synchronized with the <u>CVE</u> vulnerability naming standard.	Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in Windows Explorer in Microsoft Windows 2000 SP4, XP         SP1 and SP2, and Server 2003 SP1 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via         attack vectors involving COM objects and "crafted files and directories," aka the "Windows         Shell Vulnerability."         Published: 4/11/2006         CVSS Severity: 5.6 (Medium)         CVE-2006-0003       TA06-101A         YU#234812         Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in the RDS.Dataspace ActiveX control, which is	
Resource Status	contained in ActiveX Data Objects (ADO) and distributed in Microsoft Data Access	
NVD contains: 16418 CVE Vulnerabilities 54 US-CERT <u>Alerts</u> 1245 US-CERT <u>Vuln</u> Notes 1162 <u>Oval</u> Queries Last updated:	CVSS Severity: 5.6 (Medium)         CVE-2006-1189       TA06-101A       VU#341028         Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in Microsoft Internet Explorer 5.01 through 6 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted URL with double-byte characters,	
04/14/06	aka the "Double Byte Character Parsing Memory Corruption Vulnerability." <b>Published:</b> 4/11/2006	
Publication rate: 17 vulnerabilities / day	CVSS Severity: <u>10.0</u> (High)	
Workload Index	<u>CVE-2006-1188</u> <u>TA06-101A</u> <u>VU#824324</u>	
Vulnerability <u>Workload</u> Index: 6.89	<b>Summary:</b> Microsoft Internet Explorer 5.01 through 6 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via HTML elements with a certain crafted tag, which leads to memory corruption.	
Email List	Published: 4/11/2006 CVSS Severity: 7.0 (High)	
Enter your e-mail address and press "Add" to receive <u>NVD</u> announcements. Add	CVE-2006-1186 TA06-101A Summary: Microsoft Internet Explorer 5.01 through 6 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via by instantiating the (1) Mdt2gddr.dll, (2) Mdt2dd.dll, and (3) Mdt2gddo.dll COM objects as ActiveX controls, which leads to memory corruption. Published: 4/11/2006	
About Us	CVSS Severity: <u>10.0</u> (High)	
	<u>CVE-2006-1185</u> <u>TA06-101A</u> <u>VU#503124</u>	
NVD is a product of the	Summarv: Unspecified vulnerability in Microsoft Internet Explorer 5.01 through 6 allows	



#### NIST Checklist Program


- In response to NIST being named in the Cyber Security R&D Act of 2002.
- Encourage Vendor Development and Maintenance of Security Guidance.
- Currently Hosts 115 separate guidance documents for over 140 IT products.
  - In English Prose and automation-enabling formats (i.e. .inf files, scripts, etc.)
- Need to provide configuration data in standard, consumable format.
- http://checklists.nist.gov


#### eXtensible Configuration Checklist Description Format

- Developed by the NSA
- Designed to support:
  - Information Interchange
  - Document Generation



- Organizational and Situational Tailoring
- Automated Compliance Testing and Scoring
- Published as NIST IR 7275
- Foster more widespread application of good security practices
- http://nvd.nist.gov/scap/xccdf/xccdf.cfm





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### XML Made Simple

#### **XCCDF - eXtensible Car Care Description Format**

#### <Car>

<Description> <Year> 1997 </Year> <Make> Ford </Make> <Model> Contour </Model> <Maintenance> <Check1> Gas Cap = On <> <Check2>Oil Level = Full <> </Maintenance> </Description> </Car>


**OVAL – Open Vehicle** Assessment Language <Checks> <Check1> <Location> Side of Car <> <Procedure> Turn <> </Check1> <Check2> <Location> Hood <> </Procedure> ... <> </Check2> </Checks>

## **XCCDF & OVAL Made Simple**

**XCCDF** - eXtensible Checklist **OVAL** – Open Vulnerability **Configuration Description Format Assessment Language** <Checks> <Document ID> NIST SP 800-68 <Check1> <Date> 04/22/06 </Date> <Registry Check> ... <> <Version> 1 </Version> <Value> 8 </Value> <Revision> 2 </Revision> </Check1> <Platform> Windows XP <Check2> <Check1> Password >= 8 < <File Version> ... <> <Check2> FIPS Compliant < <Value> 1.0.12.4 </Value> </Maintenance> </Check2> </Description> </Checks> </Car>

## Application to Automated Compliance

The Connected Path



#### **Application to Automated Compliance**

800-53 Security Control DISA STIG

AC-7 Unsuccessful Login

800-68 Security Guidance DISA Checklist NSA Guide

**AC-7: Account Lockout Duration** 

AC-7: Account Lockout Threshold

NSAP Produced Security Guidance in XML Format

\_ <registry\_test id="wrt-9999" comment="Account Lockout Duration Set to 5" check="at least 5">

- <object>

<hive>HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE</hive> <key>Software\Microsoft\Windows</key> <name>AccountLockoutDuration</name> </object>

- <data operation="AND">
- <value operator="greater than">5\*</value>

#### Result

RegQueryValue (IpHKey, path, value, sKey, Value, Op); If (Op == '>") if ((sKey < Value) return (1); else return (0);

**API Call** 


IpHKey = "HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE" Path = "Software\Microsoft\Windows\" Value = "5" sKey = "AccountLockoutDuration" Op = ">"

#### COTS Tool Ingest


## Security Measurement

- How secure is my computer?
  - Measure security of the configuration
    - Measure conformance to recommended application and OS security settings
    - Measure the presence of security software (firewalls, antivirus...)
  - Measure presence of vulnerabilities (needed patches)
- How well have I implemented the FISMA requirements (NIST SP800-53 technical controls)?
  - Measure deviation from requirements
  - Measure risk to the agency

# Setting Ground Truth/Defining Security



#### Automated Security Measurement System



# Configuration Guidance in the Context of 800-53/FIPS 199

• 800-53, Appendix D specifies security control applicability according to High, Moderate, and Low impact rating of an IT System.

• 800-68 provides specific configuration information according to environment (Standalone, Enterprise, SSLF, and Legacy)

• The NIST XML specifies the applicable 800-68 security settings according to the 800-53 guidelines.

#### EXAMPLE:

- AC-12 (session termination) is applicable for IT systems with either moderate or high impact rating, but not for system rated at a low.
- The XCCDF profile for High and Moderate systems enables the group for AC-12 rule execution, but disables the group for low system.
- The XCCDF rules 'refer' to the appropriate OVAL definitions in the companion OVAL file (named: WindowsXP-SP800-68.xml)

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#### Security Content Automation Program (SCAP) Status

NIST, DISA, NSA Security Automation Conference

- September 2006
- 250+ attendees
- Keynote addresses by DISA CIAO Richard Hale, DOJ CISO Dennis Heretick, and NSA's Vulnerability Analysis and Operations Group Chief Tony Sager)
- SCAP Beta Web Site / Repository
  - Deployed on October 20<sup>th</sup>.
  - http://nvd.nist.gov/scap/scap.cfm

#### **SCAP Tool Vendor Adoption**

Tool Vendor Adoption of SCAP ThreatGuard (freetGuard Secure Elements

Tenable Nessus (under development)

Asserted Statements of Compliance to SCAP Symantec (not received) McAfee (not received) ASG (received) ManTech (evaluating) CSC (evaluating)

#### Beta Security Automation Files Available



- Windows Vista
  - Misconfigurations
  - DISA/NSA/NIST, Microsoft, Air Force policies
- Windows XP
  - Misconfigurations/Software flaws
  - NIST FISMA and DISA policies (SP 800-68 / Gold Disk)
- Windows Server 2003
  - Misconfigurations/Software flaws
  - Microsoft and NIST FISMA policies
- Red Hat Enterprise Linux
  - Software flaws

#### Many more under development!!





#### comprehensive cyber vulnerability resource

### Questions?





Peter Mell (NVD / SCAP) Stephen Quinn (SCAP / NIST Checklist Program) **Computer Security Division** NIST, Information Technology Laboratory mell@nist.gov, stquinn@nist.gov

