
Preventing execution of JIT shellcode by isolating running process

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Works in Progress
ACSAC 27

JIT Compilation causes JIT Spraying




Bypass DEP(Data Execution Prevention) and ASLR(Address Space Layout Randomization)

JIT shellcode generation mechanism

 JIT compiler generates only safe codes seemingly but they can become shellcodes

Address:	native code	assembly

03470069: B8 9090903C MOV EAX,3C909090 0347006E: 35 9090903C XOR EAX,3C909090 03470073: 35 9090903C XOR EAX,3C909090 0347007D: 35 9090903C XOR EAX,3C909090 03470082: 35 9090903C XOR EAX,3C909090



Address: native code assembly 0347006A: 90 NOP


0347006A: 90 NOP 0347006B: 90 NOP 0347006C: 90 NOP 0347006D: 3c 35 CMP AL,35

0347006F: 90 NOP 03470070: 90 NOP

. . .

One of the Countermeasures


- JIT Defender[Ping Chen et al. 2011]
 - Adds executable attributes at only execution time
 - Very simple idea and very easy to implement
 - Has a problem
 - It's probable to be attacked at execution time danger



Reference: P. Chen, Y. Fang, B. Mao, and L. Xie, "JITDefender: A defense against jit spraying attacks," in Future Challenges in Security and Privacy for Academia and Industry, vol. 354 of IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology, pp. 142–153, Springer Boston, 2011.

Our Proposal

- Process Isolation
 - Generates a child process just before execution of generated codes.
 - Parent process don't need to add executable attributes to the data area of the memory.



Check for work of our proposal

Attack success or failure

Condition	Success or Fail
normal v8 (after execution)	Success
Normal v8 (while execution)	Success
process isolated v8 (after execution)	Failure
process isolated v8 (while execution)	Failure

The checking method

- Created JavaScript code that can become JIT shellcode after JIT compilation.
- Modified a program using V8 to jump onto JIT shellcode location as a vulnerable program.

All conditions are turned ASLR off to be the program more vulnerable.

Performance Evaluation

Don't trust this data. Our implementation has not completed yet. However, process isolation itself can work.

V8 benchmarks total score average

Normal V8	Process isolated V8
7067.8	7068.2

approximately-same (**)

V8 benchmarks and V8 its own running time average

Normal V8	Process isolated V8
9.6002s	9.6310s

Only 0.3% overhead (**)



Conclusion

- Our proposal, process isolation, can prevent JIT Spraying Attacks at any time.
- It seems that our proposal's running time overhead is marginal, so it's practical.

Future Work

- Make certain our implementation.
- Consider the situation that multi threads of a parent call execution of generated codes.

Thank you for your attention!

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